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1 Introduction
In many markets the customer side is only partially informed about the product’s
characteristics. This typically applies to experience goods. A firm’s name or address
is then valuable because customers, who have previously consumed a product or
service provided by that firm, can easily recognize the product or service. For
instance, if they learned that the product is of good quality, they can repurchase
the good without risk in the future provided that the quality of the good cannot
be easily downgraded over time. A different situation arises if customers observe
an ownership change; that is, if the provider of the good or service changes while
keeping the firm’s name, address, or its customer records. Then new owners are
keen to inherit the reputation for good quality, reliable service, or good treatment.
However, it is a priori unclear why customers should trust the new owner, who may
as well be of bad quality. If good names sell at a premium, the question is whether
new good-quality providers will be willing to pay more for the firm’s name than
bad-quality providers. In other words, the question is whether a firm’s reputation
can be preserved and used by new owners. If this is the case, consumers may trust
the new provider.
In this paper we investigate these ideas in a competitive, infinitely lived market
with an inflow and outflow of market participants on both sides of the market. We
consider a market in which reputation manifests itself in an attractive customer
base. In other words, reputation is an intangible asset. Our argument applies to
the sale of a business when the ownership change (but not the price paid for the
intangible asset) is observable by customers. Observable ownership change implies
here that customers can base their decision about whether to switch or to stay
with the firm on the observation of whether an ownership change has occurred. In
equilibrium, customers ignore this information in effect and reputation lives on, and
the equilibrium supports a positive price for a firm with an attractive customer base.
We show that new owners self-select because an attractive customer base is more
valuable to new owners who do not exploit the intangible asset.
Our main result is that reputation can be a tradable asset even if ownership change
is observable. This complements the seminal work by Tadelis (1999), who shows
that the firm’s name is tradable if ownership change is, at least partly, unobservable
(see the literature review below). Our paper points to the reputation transfer from
old to new owners for markets of physicians’ and dentists’ practices, pharmacies,
and lawyers’, notaries’, and tax advisors’ offices. In all these cases, clients typically
observe any change in ownership. Another feature of these examples is that in
many countries the price for market transactions is regulated. This allows us to
focus on the pricing of the tradable asset; we abstract from pricing issues for market
transactions by assuming the price for market transactions as fixed. To guide our
modelling efforts, we take a closer look at the market for ambulatory health care
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services in Section 2.1 Because institutional arrangements differ across countries,
we collect stylized facts for one specific country, namely Germany.2 In Section 5 we
argue that our results on reputation transfer are robust to a number of modifications
and extensions of the model. In particular, they are robust to endogenizing the price
for market transactions. Therefore, our argument is more general and applies not
only to price-regulated professions but also to a wide number of owner-run businesses
in which customers are in direct contact with the owner and in which the good
or service has attributes of experience goods. This includes repair services (e. g.
garages), owner-run shops (where the service is expertise), hairdressers and the like.
Related Literature. Our paper contributes to the literature on the firm as a
bearer of reputation – this literature is reviewed in Bar-Isaac (2004a). A first attempt
to model reputation as a tradable intangible asset, represented by the firm’s name,
is the repeated game model presented by Kreps (1990). The basic idea of Kreps
is that reputation can survive ownership change because owners have an interest
in preserving the reputation and passing it on to new owners. A firm maintains
its reputation if customers believe so. However, a shortcoming of his model is that
there are multiple equilibria including equilibria in which the firm’s name has no
value.3 In our model, such an ambiguity does not arise.
Our paper analyzes a competitive market for reputation with adverse selection.
Closest in this spirit is the work by Tadelis (1999, 2003) which studies the market for
the name of a firm. He also analyzes a large population of firms and customers under
adverse selection. In his model, ownership change is, at least partly, unobservable.
The non-observability of ownership change is a necessary condition for the market for
names to be active in all periods. In addition to the observability or non-observability
of ownership change, there is another important difference between Tadelis’ and our
framework. In Tadelis’ work the firm’s name summarizes the reputation of a firm;
this name is known to all potential customers. In our framework the name of the
firm has a meaning only for the (previous) customers of that firm; it is meaningless
for all other customers. Tadelis shows that since a good new owner can build up
reputation on his own, whereas a bad new owner cannot, bad new owners have
an interest in buying good names. In his model, this effect is strong enough to
destroy the complete sorting of types: in equilibrium, some bad new owners buy
good names.4 In contrast, in our model, types are completely sorted.
1Mailath and Samuelson (2001) informally discuss that a doctor’s practice may sell at a higher
price if its reputation is good. They also observe that their model, where ownership is unobservable,
does not apply to this example.
2We establish five stylized facts. Two of those facts, namely facts 2 and 3 motivate our two-type
model. Facts 1, 4, and 5 are more general. As we show in remark 3, our main result also holds in
a model with a single type of clients.
3The same applies to the models of Choi (1998), Klein and Leffler (1981), and Shapiro (1983).
4Mailath and Samuelson (2001) and Tadelis (2002) present related analyses in a moral hazard
environment. They show that reputation transfer alleviates the moral hazard problem. In all these
papers (including ours), there is an instantaneous transfer of reputation. In other industries, such
as consulting and investment banking, a gradual transfer of reputation is more common. For a
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Another related strand of literature treats umbrella branding and brand stretching.
This refers to a situation of reputation transfer from one product to another. In a
contribution by Wernerfelt (1988), brand stretching works because the owner wants
to avoid loosing the reputation of the original product. Closer to our work is the
model of Choi (1998), in which the quality of the established product is beyond
doubt. Brand extension works here because an owner who uses the established
products’ brand name does not want to forego the earning possibilities from that
brand for future products and therefore only uses the brand name for the current
new product if the quality of this product is high. Here, the argument is reminiscent
of the ones by Klein and Leffler (1981) and Shapiro (1983) where the firm does not
deceive customers because otherwise it would suffer a long-term loss of reputation.5
Finally, Cabral (2000) considers an adverse selection environment which, in some
respects, is similar to Tadelis (1999). In his model product quality is positively
correlated across different products. He shows that brand stretching occurs if the
quality is sufficiently high. Note that in the work on brand stretching and umbrella
branding, reputation is not traded but rests with a single agent. This constitutes a
major difference to the work on reputation trading such as Tadelis (1999) and this
paper. An additional important difference is that in our paper reputation is local
and not global, as assumed in the above cited literature.
With respect to consumer behavior, our setup is related to models with switch-
ing costs – for an overview of the literature see Klemperer (1995) and Farrell and
Klemperer (2006). In our model we have two kinds of switching costs. First, a
customer who finds that a firm is good is inclined to stay because he is taking a
gamble when switching companies. This means that such a customer behaves as if
he faces switching costs.6 These switching costs are endogenous and may depend
on the type of customer. Second, in addition to these switching costs arising from
asymmetric information, there are exogenous switching costs which do not depend
on the type of customer. This makes it costly for customers to leave the status quo,
independent of their type.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we present our illustrative example,
the sale of a physician’s practice. In section 3 we present the model. In section 4
we characterize an equilibrium in which there is a positive price for the sale of an
intangible asset. In this equilibrium, new owners are sorted, that is, good new
owners buy firms with a good reputation, and bad new owners buy firms with a
bad reputation. Although a good new owner can build up a reputation over time
formal analysis see Morrison and Wilhelm (2004) and Bar-Isaac (2004b).
5See also Andersson (2002) for an analysis in a moral hazard environment.
6Fishman and Rob (2002) consider a firm’s decision to invest in quality over time, where only
past realized qualities are observable. With respect to the customer behavior, our models are
similar. Fishman and Rob postulate that a share of customers are experienced: these are customers
who learn about the past quality of one of the firms. If a customer with information leaves that
firm, he goes to a different firm at random. The remaining share of customers do not have previous
knowledge; in our model these are new customers.
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on his own, this is less profitable than buying a reputation. We furthermore show
that non-informative equilibria do not exist. In section 5 we discuss our results
and possible extensions of the model. The proofs of the lemmas and the analyses
under an alternative information assumption and under an alternative parameter
constellation are relegated to the appendix.
2 An Illustrative Example: The Sale of a Doctor’s
Practice
In this section, we present our exemplary story: the sale of a doctor’s practice.
For illustration, we first establish some stylized facts for the ambulatory health
care sector in Germany which guide our modelling effort.7 We then spell out our
modelling strategy.
Patients and Practices in Germany: Some Stylized Facts. In the ambula-
tory health care sector in Germany, treatments are almost exclusively provided by
office-based for-profit physicians – we call them doctors.8 Doctors typically run their
own practices; group practices are less common except for some apparatus-intensive
specializations.9 In the former case, a change in ownership is an abrupt shift for
patients. It is thus clearly observable to patients.
Stylized Fact 1. Ownership change is observable.
This fact is the starting point of our modelling effort and the main distinguishing
feature from related literature. A practice is typically sold when the old doctor
retires, which can be seen as an exogenous event. A retiring doctor puts the practice
up for sale, and it is acquired by a new doctor. Among other factors, the price of
the practice depends on the number and type of treatments in a particular period
and on the composition of the patient base.
Stylized Fact 2. There are two types of patients: high-value and low-value pa-
tients.
In Germany, health insurance is compulsory. Essentially, there are two types of
patients: those insured by a statutory sickness fund (around 51 million members
plus dependents in 1999) and those insured by a private health insurance company
(around 7 million fully insured in 1999), see e. g. “Health Care Systems in Transition:
7A good source on the institutional features of the German health care system for non-German
speakers is “Health Care Systems in Transition: Germany”, published in 2000 by the European
Observatory on Health Care Systems.
8Hospitals provide ambulatory treatments mainly in emergency cases.
9If the practice is run by a single doctor, the dominating channel of reputation transfer is from
the retiring to the new doctor. In the case of group practices, reputation transfer can be achieved
through additional channels (as in Tirole, 1996).
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Germany”, published in 2000 by the European Observatory on Health Care Systems.
For any treatment a doctor charges a fixed fee, depending on the type of treatment.
If the patient has private insurance, doctors charge a multiple of the fee which
is charged to patients who are insured by a statutory sickness fund; this factor
is regulated and depends on the type of treatment. In addition, patients with a
private insurance typically have wider coverage for treatments. This means that
a privately insured patient is of high value to a doctor. Doctors typically do not
provide treatment exclusively for high-value patients: Among the 120,000 registered
doctors in the ambulatory health care system, only 5,800 do not have agreements
with the statutory sickness funds (data for the year 2000 from the German Medical
Association). All doctors who have such agreements have the right to treat privately
insured patients. Hence, the vast majority of practices have two types of patients.
Stylized Fact 3. High-value patients are more likely to change practices.
Guides for doctors caution new doctors not to take for granted that privately in-
sured patients will stay with a practice after an ownership change. For instance, in
his guide book on the sale and acquisition of a physician’s practice, Klapp (1996,
p. 31) writes that privately insured patients are more likely to switch practices than
patients who are insured by a statutory sickness fund.10 In theory, the German am-
bulatory system is characterized by the patient’s freedom to choose and the doctor’s
obligation to treat. In practice, however, some doctors reject low-value patients,
whereas they accept high-value patients. 11 In effect, since low-value patients are
more likely to be rejected (or to be treated less favorably), they have a lower incen-
tive to switch practices.
Stylized Fact 4. Patients tend to have local information about the quality of
doctors.
A patient-doctor relationship tends to be long-term. There appears to be little
market transparency on the quality of doctors; for example, no ranking or outside
advice is available which would provide a recommendation about the quality of a
doctor. Advertising is severely restricted. Patients therefore typically have much
better information about the quality of “their” doctor than of other doctors. Stylized
fact 4 implies that patients stay with a good doctor. The open question is whether
new doctors can at least partly benefit from a large share of high-value patients of
the retiring doctor. There is a tension: on the one hand it is commonly accepted
that a large share of private patients can be seen as a negative factor for the value
10More precisely, he states that after an ownership change an average of 30% of privately insured
patients switch. While the equilibrium of our model does not feature the fact that switching rates
depend on ownership change, this is easily accommodated in a modified model by introducing
horizontal taste heterogeneity among patients; see the discussion.
11This is often done in a subtle way. For instance, the next available date for a treatment of
a new patient depends on whether he is privately insured or not. Also, a new patient calling up
a practice is often told that unfortunately, a practice cannot take more patients. Matters change
when the patient tells that he is privately insured.
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of a practice because of the risk that they will switch practices (see Klapp, 1996).
On the other hand, privately insured patients are of high value to doctors.
Stylized Fact 5. Practices with a large share of high-value patients are sold at a
premium.
In practitioners guides for German doctors it is recognized that in general a practice
for sale with a large share of high-value patients is potentially more profitable – in
spite of stylized fact 3. Klapp (1996, p. 31-32) states that every new doctor will
appreciate a large share of privately insured patients. Checking Internet announce-
ments for the sale of practices, we found that a large share of high-value patients
is advertised as a selling point for practices. Hence, a retiring doctor with a large
share of high-value patients can expect to receive a premium.
Fact 5 suggests that new doctors must be confident of retaining at least a fraction
of the patients. Together with fact 4, this implies that a good doctor is more likely
to enjoy long-term profit from these patients than a bad doctor. This makes a good
doctor bid higher than a bad doctor, ceteris paribus. However, a good doctor may
buy a practice with a small share of high-value patients and gradually improve his
base. Since new patients arrive in each period, and among experienced patients
high-value patients are more likely to switch (fact 3), a practice with a small share
of high-value patients is more profitable for a good than a bad doctor. This in effect
reduces a new doctor’s willingness to pay for a practice with a large share of high-
value patients. Our analysis captures these two countervailing effects. Furthermore,
our model accommodates the five stylized facts stated above. Facts 1, 2, and 4 are
reflected in our model assumptions. Facts 3 and 5 are equilibrium outcomes.
The Sale of a Doctor’s Practice: Our Modelling Strategy. A doctor is
interested in utilizing the full capacity of his practice and in attracting high-value
patients. In our model total capacity equals demand, and there are no frictions that
leave some patients without treatment.12 Hence, all practices operate under full
capacity and only differ regarding the composition of patients.
Patients can be of high or of low value to doctors. They prefer good doctors, but
can tell the quality of a doctor only from experience. Patients obtain only “local”
information: they learn the quality of “their” doctor, but do not know the quality
of the others. Clearly, if patients experience that their doctor is good and this
doctor remains active in the next period, they have no reason to switch practices.
If, however, patients observe an ownership change, they initially lack knowledge
about the quality of the new doctor. Still, they can use their past experience with
the old doctor to form beliefs about the quality of the new doctor.
Suppose that patients believe that the new doctor is as good as the old. In this case,
a practice with a larger share of high-value patients is more valuable. This holds
12We also consider the case that there is a single patient type and excess capacity. Our main
findings are robust to this modification (see remark 3). See also the discussion section.
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true for good and bad new doctors alike. However, the difference in profits for the
two types of practices is greater for good than for bad new doctors. The reason is
essentially that a bad new doctor loses many high-value patients after one period,
whereas a good new doctor retains them and building up an attractive patient base
takes a lot of time for a good doctor. Consequently, good new doctors are willing to
pay a higher price for a practice with a large share of high-value patients than bad
new doctors, and doctors self-select.
3 The Model
We consider a stationary environment where time is discrete, t ∈ Z. There are
two groups of agents, doctors and patients. Here, doctors are the providers of a
service, and patients are the customers. Doctors are of either good or bad type,
denoted by d ∈ {G,B}. Patients are of high or of low value for a doctor, denoted
by p ∈ {H,L}.13
Doctors. A fraction λG of doctors is of type G; the remaining fraction λB = 1−λG
is of type B.14 The type d of a doctor is observable to the patient after a treatment.
Hence the treatment is an experience good in the extreme form that goodwill has
the maximum duration of one period. Doctors provide treatments, for which they
charge fixed fees fp > 0 that depend on the patient’s type. Each doctor has a fixed
capacity, which, without loss of generality, is set equal to 1. The opportunity cost
of providing a treatment we set equal to zero. Suppose that a doctor has a share χd
of high-value patients. Then his per-period profit is χdfH + (1− χd)fL.
In each period, a doctor realizes that he is becoming too old to run his practice with
probability δd > 0, in which case he must sell and retire.
15 Assuming stochastic
independence, this results in a share of δd doctors retiring in each period. In each
period, a continuum of mass δd of new doctors arrives; hence at each point in time
there is a continuum of doctors of mass 1. New doctors observe the type of a
retiring doctor.16 The practices then are sold at some price T , which depends on
that composition.
Doctors maximize the sum of the net present value of fees and the net present value
of the sale of a practice. There is no discounting beyond that which arises from the
probability of exit.
13Note that we use the letter d as index for doctors as well as for the doctors’ type; similarly,
the letter p is used for patients.
14Greek letters are used for probabilities and rates.
15Note that it can be shown that the doctor does not have an incentive to sell the practice before
he reaches retirement.
16In appendix A.2, we discuss the case that new doctors only learn the composition of the
patients at the practice for sale but not the retiring doctor’s type. Our insights are robust this
alternative specification, see also section 5.
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Patients. The continuum of patients has mass ‘1× 1’. There is thus a continuum
of mass 1 per practice. Patients frequent a doctor once in a period. Hence, the total
capacity of all practices just covers the total demand for treatments. Note that even
if a share of patients leaves a particular practice, vacant slots for treatments are
refilled within each period. As a result, we may focus on the composition of patients
at a practice.
For both types of patients, the utility derived from a treatment of a good doctor
is higher than that from that of a bad doctor, uG > uB. A fraction λH of patients
is of type H; the remaining fraction λL = 1 − λH is of type L. High- and low-
value patients differ in the fees fp that they pay for a treatment, fH > fL. As a
reinterpretation, we can consider the model with a single type of patients and excess
capacity (see remark 3 below).
In each period, a patient exits with probability δp > 0.
17 Assuming stochastic
independence, this results in a share of δp patients exiting in each period. In each
period, a continuum of mass δp of new patients arrives; hence at each point in time
there is a continuum of patients of mass 1 of which 1 − δp are experienced and δp
are new.
Patients who do not exit may decide to switch practices. If a patient switches prac-
tices he incurs an exogenous switching cost s ≥ 0. This switching cost is independent
of the patient’s current practice and independent of any loss of information. For in-
stance, when accepted by a new practice, the newly arrived patient must fill out
forms, and medical records must be transferred from the practice where the patient
used to be. Patients maximize expected utility; there is no discounting.
A share of patients χd at a particular practice of type d are of high value, and
the remaining share 1 − χd are of low value. In a stationary world in which the
patient base does not change over time and only depends on the doctor’s type, we
can describe it by χG and χB, respectively. In table 1, we have summarized the
notation of the model. Note that χG, χB and T are endogenous. Figure 1 displays
the weight of good and bad practices and the composition of their clienteles. White
areas add up to λL; gray areas add up to λH . The figure can be used to understand
the streams of patients between practices.
Time Structure. The sequence of events is the same in each period. First, all
doctors observe whether they must retire. If necessary, they then put their practice
up for sale and reveal the composition of their patient base χ to entering new doctors.
The latter make take-it-or-leave-it offers to retiring doctors T , which can depend on
their own type (d ∈ {G,B}), on the retiring doctor’s type (dold ∈ {G,B}), and on
the composition of the patients at the practice, χ. Retiring doctors then accept the
highest bid. In case of a tie between a good and a bad doctor, we use the tie-breaking
17Note that we model a good treatment as life-improving, but not as life-prolonging.
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d ∈ {G,B} types of doctors
p ∈ {H,L} types of patients
λG, λB fraction of good and bad doctors
λH , λL fraction of high- and low-value patients
δd, δp exit and arrival rates of doctors and patients, respectively
fH , fL fee per treatment
uG, uB utility derived from a treatment
s switching costs for a change of a practice
χG, χB fractions of high-value patients in good and bad practices









Figure 1: Fractions of Doctors and Patients
rule that the doctor who would be willing to pay infinitesimally more wins and pays
his bid price.
The ownership change, but not the price paid by the new doctor, is observed by
the patients of that practice. Conditional on that information and the doctor’s type
of the previous period, and provided they do not leave the market, they choose
whether to stay or switch practices. We assume that if patients change practices or
newly arrive in the market, they apply at new practices with uniform distribution,
knowing neither the reputation of the practice nor their chances of being accepted.
Hence reputation is only local. If a patient is rejected by a practice he continues
to search for a practice until he is accepted. Hence, in each period, every patient is
matched to some practice.
Remark 1 (Local versus Global Reputation) If reputation were publicly ob-
servable, then patients could coordinate on this information. This would give rise
to the emergence of multiple equilibria. For example, the patients’ equilibrium be-
liefs may be that practices previously run by good doctors are always bought by bad
doctors. With local reputation, such counterintuitive equilibria do not exist.
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• old doctor observes whether he must retire, announces retirement
(if necessary), reveals private clientele χ to new doctors
• new doctor makes bid T for a practice of a retiring doctor, poten-
tially depending on his own type d, the retiring doctor’s type dold,
and the clientele of the practice χt−1
• highest bid is accepted, ownership changes. In the case of a tie
between a good and a bad doctor, one who would be willing to
bid infinitesimally more wins.
• patients observe whether doctor continues or ownership changes
• patients of measure δp leave the system, patients of measure δp
enter the system, remaining patients of measure 1 − δp stay or
switch practices, doctors observe the type of applying patients
and accept or reject application
• treatment
• patients observe the type of their doctor
next
period
Figure 2: Time Structure of the Game
Doctors observe the patient’s type and can accept or reject the patient. If patients
switch practices, they incur a switching cost s ≥ 0, which we have introduced above.
This switching cost is, for simplicity, assumed to be independent of the number of
attempts made to be accepted by another practice. If the switching cost increased
in the number of attempts, this would make switching less attractive for low-value
patients because, as we will show, they are rejected with positive probability, whereas
high-value patients are always accepted.
Finally, once all patients are allocated to practices, each patient receives a treatment,
after which he observes the doctor’s type. Figure 2 summarizes the sequence of
events in one period t.
Strategies. Patients observe dt−1 and whether an ownership change has happened
in period t, where Y stands for “yes” and N for “no”. Hence, the patients’ informa-
tion is an element of {G,B}×{Y,N}. Given the information of a patient of type p,
his strategy is to “stay”, to “switch” or to randomize between those. σtp( · , · ) ∈ [0; 1]
denotes the switching probability. Doctors always accept high-value patients and
randomly fill up the remaining capacity with low-value patients.
The strategy of retiring doctors does not need to be formalized, because they simply
accept the highest offer from new doctors. The strategy of new doctors is to “make
offer T”. Formally, σtd(χt−1, dold) ∈ R+.
Beliefs. Each patient must hold beliefs for three different situations that can
occur: he stays and the practice does not change hands; he stays and the practice
does change hands; he does not stay. First, his beliefs about the probability of
being accepted by a good doctor if he stays with the practice which is not for sale is
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denoted by βtH(dt−1, N) ∈ [0; 1] and βtL(dt−1, N) ∈ [0; 1]. Because the doctor’s type
is perfectly observable after a treatment, we must have




1 if dt−1 = G
0 if dt−1 = B
.
Second, each patient holds beliefs about the probability with which the next doctor
will be good if the practice is sold, βtH(dt−1, Y ) ∈ [0; 1] and βtL(dt−1, Y ) ∈ [0; 1]. If
reputation transfer is successful, beliefs depend on the quality of the retiring doctor.
Finally, patients hold beliefs about the probability with which they end up at a
good doctor if they switch, denoted by βtp(∅, ∅), where (∅, ∅) stands for the lack of
information regarding the doctor. Note that beliefs possibly depend on the patient’s
type, i. e. βtH(∅, ∅) = βtL(∅, ∅), because the probability of being accepted may differ
between patients of different types. We will see that, in equilibrium, high-value
patients are always accepted, while low-value patients are sometimes rejected by
good doctors.
Retiring doctors do not need to hold any beliefs; they possess all payoff relevant
information. New doctors observe the fraction of high-value patients of the practices
they bid for, χt−1, and the retiring doctor’s type. Consequently, they can infer the
patients’ behavior in the following period.
Equilibrium. We refer to an equilibrium if agents maximize their utility given their
beliefs while anticipating future behavior of other agents, if beliefs are confirmed by
the behavior of agents, and if the market for practices clears in each period. Agents
update their beliefs using Bayes’ rule whenever applicable. Hence, in particular,
equilibria are perfect Bayesian.
4 Symmetric Stationary Equilibria
In this section we characterize stationary equilibria. In doing so, we must specify
how large the fractions of good doctors and of high-value patients are. The reason
is that the availability of good doctors determines the behavior of consumers. For
example, if good doctors were so scarce that their capacity was insufficient to cater to
all high-value patients, under perfect information, low-value patients would always
be rejected – this case is analyzed in the appendix. In the main text, we will focus
on the reverse situation, where high-value patients are always accepted when asking
for a treatment at a particular practice. In this case, under perfect information, low-
value patients also have a chance to be treated by a good doctor. Because of market
clearing (λG+λB = λH +λL), this must also hold under asymmetric information. In
particular, a low-value patient who switches practices has a positive probability of
being accepted by a good doctor. This implies that, in the absence of switching costs,
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all patients who learn that their doctor is bad and continues will change practices.
Such a massive turnover of patients is avoided if moderate switching costs exist.
We will describe exactly such a situation regarding switching costs, in which only
high-value patients switch after learning that a doctor was bad. To be precise, the
main point of this section is to construct an equilibrium in which there is a strictly
positive price for a practice with good reputation. In this equilibrium, good new
doctors buy practices with good reputation, and bad new doctors buy practices with
bad reputation. We show that it is not worthwhile for a good new doctor to buy a
cheap practice with bad reputation and build up the reputation himself.
4.1 Informative Equilibrium
In this subsection we consider a particular class of equilibria, which we call infor-
mative. An equilibrium is said to be informative if several properties are met, as
spelled out in the definition below. We focus on parameter constellations so that
patients do not switch practices unless a high-value patient learns that his doctor is
bad.
Definition 1 (Informative Equilibrium) An equilibrium is called informative if
it is characterized by the following observable strategies (along the equilibrium path).
1. Old low-value patients stay with their practices. Old high-value patients stay
if their doctor was good, otherwise they switch.
2. New low- and new high-value patients choose their practice at random.
3. New good doctors buy from good old doctors at a high transfer price; new bad
doctors buy from bad old doctors at a low transfer price.
Here, item 1 implies especially that the switching behavior of patients is independent
of whether an ownership change takes place. Item 2 is obvious because new patients
do not have any information that they can base any decision on. Item 3 really
characterizes the informativeness of the equilibrium: The type of the buying doctor
is identical to that of the selling doctor. The market mechanism provides for perfect
sorting.
Strategies and Beliefs in the Informative Equilibrium. We define strategies
and beliefs of doctors and patients. We will show that these strategies and beliefs
form an informative equilibrium for certain parameter constellations.
Possible information sets of patients are {G,B}×{Y,N}∪{∅, ∅}. Either the patient
has experienced a good (G) or a bad (B) doctor, who either keeps his practice (N)
or retires (Y ); or the patient comes to an unknown practice and knows nothing
({∅, ∅}).
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The strategies of high-value and low-value patients are given by
σtH(G, Y ) = 0, σ
t
H(G,N) = 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
σtH(G, · )= 0
,(1)
σtH(B, Y ) = 1, σ
t
H(B,N) = 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
σtH(B, · )= 1
,(2)
σtL( · , · ) = 0.(3)
Here, (1) means that high-value patients stay if they detect good quality, indepen-
dently of an ownership change. The probability of a change is 0. (2) denotes that
high-value patients switch if they detect bad quality, independently of an ownership
change. The probability of a change is 1. (3) signifies that low-value patients never
switch. Retiring doctors have no strategy; they simply accept the highest offer. New
doctors choose strategies
σtG(χG, G) = Tmin, σ
t
G(χB, B) = 0,
σtB(χG, G) = Tmin, σ
t
B(χB, B) = 0,
where Tmin > 0 will be defined in the following.
The beliefs of patients are given by probability distributions,




1 if dt−1 = G
0 if dt−1 = B
,(4)
βtH(dt−1, Y ) = β
t
L(dt−1, Y ) =
{
1 if dt−1 = G
0 if dt−1 = B
,(5)
βtH(∅, ∅) = λG,(6)
βtL(∅, ∅) = λG Pr{accepted by G|L}.(7)
Here, (4) means that if high-value and low-value patients stay with their practice
and the doctor does not retire, then the doctor’s type remains unchanged. (5) means
that even if the doctor retires, patients believe that the new doctor will almost surely
have the same type. (6) means that a switching high-value patient believes he will
find a good doctor with probability λG, and a bad doctor otherwise. Finally, (7)
means that a switching low-value patient believes he will find a good doctor only with
probability λG Pr{accepted by G|L} (calculated in the following), and a bad doctor
otherwise. Note that the patients’ beliefs depend only on the latest performance
of their doctor, not on his former quality. In equilibrium, this is irrelevant. The
out-of-equilibrium analysis may well depend on these beliefs.
The Clientele of Practices. The dominant strategy for a high-value patient is to
leave his doctor if he is bad, provided that the probability that he will be accepted
by a good doctor is positive (and if switching costs are reasonably low). In each
period, the number of high-value patients that apply for places at good practices is
(8) δp λG λH + χB (1− δp) (1− λG)λG,
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because of the newly born patients δp, a share λH is high-value, and of these a
fraction λG applies at a good practice. Let χB denote the equilibrium fraction of
high-value patients at bad practices. A fraction (1 − δp) of them does not exit; a
fraction λG of them arrives at a good practice; and 1 − λG = λB is the weight for
the mass of bad practices.
Because of the stationarity of equilibrium, this number must be equal to that of
exiting high-value patients in good practices, δp χG λG, where χG is the fraction of
high-value patients at good practices. Hence
δp χG λG = δp λG λH + χB (1− δp) (1− λG)λG,
δp χG = δp λH + χB (1− δp) (1− λG),
χG = λH + χB (1− λG) 1− δp
δp
.
The number of high-value patients at good and bad practices must add up to the
number of high-value patients in the economy, thus




λH + χB (1− λG) 1− δp
δp
)
λG + χB (1− λG),
λH = λG λH + χB
(







(1− λG) (1 + λG 1−δpδp )
=
δp λH
δp + λG (1− δp) .(10)
Here, δp → 0 implies χB → 0: If patients never exit, all high-value patients land at
a good doctor after some time. Furthermore, δp → 1 implies χB → λH : If patients
live for one period only, the fraction of high-value patients at a bad doctor’s equals

















1− δp (1− λG)








Here, δp → 0 implies χG → λH/λG: If patients never exit, high-value patients are
eventually shared between good doctors. Furthermore, δp → 1 implies χG → λH :
Analogously to bad doctors, good doctors also only get the population mix if patients
live for one period only, and no information/reputation can be passed on. One
can say that δp is a measure for how much information is handed down from one
generation of patients to the next.
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From (11), we can derive a condition that guarantees that high-value patients are
always accepted by good doctors,
χG < 1 ⇐⇒ λH < δp + λG (1− δp).(12)
For the rest of the section, assume that (12) holds.
A Lower Bound on Switching Costs s. If switching costs are very low, then not
only high-value patients try to switch to good practices, but also low-value patients.
The only difference between the types is that high-value patients are accepted with
probability 1 (their only problem is to find a good practice). Low-value patients run
the risk of being rejected if they find a good practice. We now look for the minimum
switching cost that guarantees no switching for low-value patients, making use of






1− λH (1− λG)
1− δp
δp + λG (1− δp)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=: Pr{accepted by G|L}
(uG − uB).
For details, see the proof of lemma 1 in the appendix.
Lemma 1 If s ≥ sL all low-value patients stay with their old practice.
For lower switching costs, a positive share of low-value patients switches after en-
countering a bad doctor. Below a critical value s˜L all low-value patients switch
practices (see figure 3 and remark 2). Note that our main result on reputation
transfer does not require any lower bound on switching costs (they only must be
positive, see below).
An Upper Bound on Switching Costs s. Clearly, if s is sufficiently high, even
high-value patients will not want to switch, despite their relatively high probability
of being accepted by a good doctor. In this case, reputation transfer is not possible.




(uG − uB) > sL.
Lemma 2 If s ≤ sH all high-value patients switch practices after encountering a
bad doctor.
Because in the main text we want to focus on equilibria in which low-value patients
do not switch, we only consider the region s ∈ [sL, sH ], as defined by (13) and
(13). For lower switching costs, we distinguish between two intervals. In the interval
18The single deviation principle implies that only one-time deviations need to be considered.
Furthermore, the notion of equilibrium implies that only unilateral deviations must be taken into
account.






Figure 3: Switching Probabilities πH and πL of Patients
(s˜L, sL), a positive share of low-value patients would switch practices in each period.
If s = s˜L, low-value patients are indifferent about switching or not, even if all other
low-value patients switch. In the range [0, s˜L], even all low-value patients would
switch. In this case, stylized fact 3 is violated. Note, however, that our qualitative
and most of our quantitative results remain unchanged for s < sL. In particular,
a doctor’s profits and the decisions of high-value patients are unaffected by the
switching costs s, as long s < sH . The probabilities of switching from a bad practice
are illustrated in figure 3.
The Separating Transfer Price T . Bad new doctors buy practices at a price
TB = 0. The reason is that they can make the retiring doctors take-it-or-leave-it
offers, hence they choose the lowest possible transfer price, TB = 0.
19 If a bad




(1− δd)t (χB fH + (1− χB) fL)
=
χB fH + (1− χB) fL
δd
.(15)
How much can a bad new doctor gain by bidding for a good old practice? If he is
successful, his expected profits consist of four components: First, the profits from
a good practice, χG fH + (1 − χG) fL, are earned for one period. Second, when he
retires, the then buying doctor will bid only TB = 0 for the practice. Third, the
doctor will loose all high-value patients immediately and get a bad doctor’s profit
for the rest of his life time. Fourth, he must pay the high transfer price TG right
19One may also assume that, as an outside option, new doctors can found their own practices.
This has exactly the same value as purchasing an bad old practice: If an bad old practice is bought,
the high-value patients are anticipated to leave before the next treatment. Therefore in the next
period, the only high-value patients are the ones just arriving. If a new practice is founded, the
only high-value patients are, again, the ones just arriving. The proportion is identical.
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away,
ΠB(χG) = (χG fH + (1− χG) fL) + (1− δd) χB fH + (1− χB) fL
δd
+ TB − TG.
In a separating equilibrium, ΠB(χG) ≤ ΠB(χB) must hold. This can be rewritten as
TG ≥ (χG − χB) (fH − fL)
= (fH − fL) λH (1− δp)
δp + λG (1− δp) =: Tmin.(16)
where Tmin is the minimum transfer price that guarantees separating.
The Decision Problem of a New Good Doctor. So far, we have examined
how high the transfer price of a good practice TG must be to deter bad doctors from
buying it (i. e., Tmin). But at this transfer price, is the purchase profitable for a good




(1− δd)t (χG fH + (1− χG) fL)
=
χG fH + (1− χG) fL
δd
.(17)
Building up Goodwill. Instead of buying a good practice, a good doctor may
buy a bad practice with clientele χB, and high-value patients will accumulate at the
practice by and by. That is, he builds up reputation over time. As we will show
below, the good doctor prefers to buy a good practice at price Tmin rather than
a bad practice at price 0 if the following two properties hold: χt ∈ [χB; χG] and
Tt ∈ [0; Tmin). We now will show that there is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium with
these properties; we show this by fully characterizing it.
In period t = 0, be χB the fraction of high-value patients. In t = 1, all surviving
high-value patients stay, and additionally a fraction χB of high-value patients arrive.
Because every high-value patient leaves a bad practice immediately, the fraction of
high-value patients at a bad practice is identical to those arriving at a practice
in one period. The fraction is χB (1 − δp) + χB. In t = 2, the fraction becomes
χB (1− δp)2 + χB (1− δp) + χB. In period t, it amounts to
(18) χt = (1− δp)χ0 +
t−1∑
τ=0
χB (1− δp)t = χG − (1− δp)t (χG − χB).
As t →∞, this term approaches χG, and the doctor has fully built up his reputation.
20Note that Tmin does not appear in the equation, because it is spent in at the date of purchase
and regained at the date of retirement with probability 1.
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We now construct a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, regarding the off-equilibrium ac-
tion by a good doctor buying a bad practice. The main difficulty consists in con-
structing a sequence Tτ which supports a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, i. e., the
price a doctor gets if he sells this practice (with an accrued clientele χt < χG).
When a good doctor retires after finite time, the clientele is χt instead of χG. As
a consequence, he will get a lower transfer price T (χt) when selling the practice,
which he will already take into account when buying the practice. The transfer price
T (χt) must be determined off the equilibrium path. Of course, the transfer price
will depend on who wants to buy a practice with clientele χt, good or bad doctors.
In the following, we will first presume that practices with clienteles between χB and
χG are bought by bad young doctors. We will then derive transfer prices, then show
that good doctors do not have an incentive to buy a bad practice in the first place.
Finally, we will show that good doctors indeed do not buy practices with clienteles
between χB and χG, off the equilibrium path.
Given that bad doctors value practices with a clientele between χB and χG more
than good doctors do, the transfer price will be determined by their willingness to
pay, which is
(19) T (χt) = (fH − fL) (χt+1 − χB),
in analogy to 16. The reason for the index χt+1 is that the patients of the good
doctor all believe that the practice will again be bought by a good doctor, and will
thus stay. Hence the practice has clientele χt when it is sold, but in the next relevant
period, it rises to χt+1.
A good doctor who buys a bad practice for TB = 0 has clientele χB in the first
period, because all old high-value patients believe that the practice will be bought
by a bad doctor, and will thus switch. Still, if the new good doctor would have to
sell after one period, he would get a transfer price that is higher than TB = 0. The
buying doctor appreciates that the selling doctor is good, and that his high-value
patients will stay for the next period. Hence the offer will be T (χ0) > 0. This
happens with probability δd. With (1 − δd) δd, the doctor sells after two periods, a
practice with clientele χ1, and so forth. The expected revenue to the doctor is the




(1− δd)t(χt fH + (1− χt) fL) +
∞∑
t=0




+ (fH − fL) δd χB + (1− δd)δp χG
δd (δd (1− δp) + δp)
+ (fH − fL) (χG − χB) δp




+ (fH − fL) δp λH
δp (1− λG) + λG
1 + δd (1− δp)
δd (1− δp) + δp .(20)
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Comparing ΠG(χB) with ΠG(χG), one finds that the first is always smaller than
the latter. This implies that a good young doctor has an incentive to buy a good
practice. Finally, we need to check that good doctors do not want to overbid bad
ones for practices with medium clientele. The expected profit of a good doctor




(1− δd)τ (χt+1+τ fH + (1− χt+1+τ ) fL) +
∞∑
τ=0
(1− δd)τδd T (χt+τ ).
Of course, this term equals ΠG(χG) for t → ∞. After a long time, the clientele χt
converges to χG, and hence a good new doctor is nearly indifferent between buying
a good practice, and one with clientele χt. Also, the derivative of the term with
respect to t is positive. This implies that for t < ∞, the profit from a χt-practice
is below ΠG(χG). Hence indeed, good doctors have no incentive to buy a practice
with clientele below χG, which completes our argument.
Summing up our previous analysis, we have the following results.
Proposition 1 (Informative Equilibrium) Suppose λH < λG + δP (1 − λG). If
s ∈ [sL; sH ], then there is an informative equilibrium.
Good new doctors buy χG-practices from good retiring doctors at the transfer price
Tmin; bad new doctors buy χB-practices from bad retiring doctors at the transfer
price 0.
Remark 2 (Low Switching Costs) If switching costs s are low (s < sL), a dif-
ferent sort of informative equilibrium exists (for details see appendix A.1). The only
difference from the equilibrium of proposition 1 is that low-value patients also switch
with a certain positive probability σtL(B, · ) > 0. Their strategies must be modified
accordingly. If s ≤ s˜L, this probability is 1, with
s˜L = (uG − uB) λH
δp + δd (1− δp) .
What happens if λH > λG + δP (1 − λG)? Then, in equilibrium, low-value patients
are always rejected by a good doctor and even a high-value patient runs the risk
of being rejected by a good doctor. This means that the calculations have to be
modified substantially. The new feature under this parameter constellation is that
a good doctor can build up a reputation in finite time. Still, our basic insight that
good new doctors prefer to buy χG-practice holds so that building up a reputation is
not an equilibrium phenomenon. The formal analysis is relegated to appendix A.3.
To summarize, if switching costs are not excessive reputation transfer is supported
as an equilibrium phenomenon provided that the share of high-value patients is
sufficiently small. A reinterpretation of our model is one with a single patient type
and aggregate excess capacity of practices.
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Remark 3 (Single Patient Type) Suppose that only a single type of patient ex-
ists, but that there is excess capacity in the market. This means that doctors are
interested in a large patient base. A new doctor then makes his bid for a practice,
dependent upon the number of treatments in the previous period. Such a situation
is simply a reinterpretation of our model, where low-value patients are effectively
ignored (by setting fL = 0). In equilibrium, good and bad doctors have excess ca-
pacity but good doctors provide more treatments. Bad doctors pick up patients who,
after the treatment, switch immediately. If there are more patients such that the
parameter condition of appendix A.3 holds, good doctors operate under full capacity
and only bad doctors have excess capacity.
4.2 Non-Existence of Uninformative Equilibrium
In this section we show that equilibria in which types do not sort do not exist.
Definition 2 (Uninformative Equilibrium) An equilibrium is called uninforma-
tive if it is characterized by the following observable strategies (along the equilibrium
path).
1. Old low-value patients stay with their practices. Old high-value patients stay
if their doctor was good or retires; otherwise they switch.
2. New low- and high-value patients choose their practices at random.
3. New doctors buy from old doctors at random. The type of the old doctor
contains no information on the new doctor.
In comparison to the first item of definition 1, item 1 here says that high-value
patients switch away from bad doctors unless ownership changes. Item 2 is the
same as in definition 1. Item 3 justifies the name “uninformative equilibrium”.
There is no relation between the type of the selling and that of the buying doctor.
Proposition 2 (Uninformative Equilibria) Assume that
s < (uG − uB) λH
δp + δd (1− δp) .
Then there is no uninformative stationary equilibrium.
Intuitively, the proof can be made by contradiction: Assume there is an uninforma-
tive equilibrium. Then patients consistently must believe that the expected quality
of a new doctor is average, independently of whether the practice used to be good
or bad before. The retiring doctor’s type contains no information about the type of
the new doctor. Now patients always stay with good doctors, whereas high-value
patients switch away from bad doctors who do not retire. This implies that, during
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their professional life, good doctors accumulate a better clientele than bad doctors.
Because patients expect that their probability of getting a good doctor is indepen-
dent of whether they stay or switch after the retirement of their doctor; they stay
because of the (possibly infinitesimal) switching costs s. This implies that doctors
must believe that they can inherit a good clientele and turn it into profit. As in
section 4.1, a high-value clientele is relatively more valuable for good doctors. As a
result, good doctors bid higher transfer prices; hence patients of good practices tend
to remain in the hands of good doctors. This contradicts the uninformativeness of
stationary equilibrium. A formal proof follows.
Proof of proposition 2: The maximal switching costs sH under which high-value
patients switch from bad doctors are lower in the uninformative equilibrium. The
reason is that if they find a good doctor, they can only be sure that the practice
will remain good until the old doctor retires. Hence
sH = λG (uG − uB)
∞∑
t=0
(1− δp)t (1− δd)t
= (uG − uB) λG
1− (1− δp)t (1− δd)t = (uG − uB)
λG
δp + δd (1− δp) .
Suppose that s < sH so that high-value patients do not stay with doctors whom
they know to be bad.
Assume that at a point in time, practices with differing clienteles χ′B and χ
′
τ are for
sale. Let χ′B denote the clientele of a bad doctor. Note that χ
′
B = χB, because the
fraction of high-value patients at a bad doctor depends on the size and composition
of the stream of patients who change practices each period. Let χ′τ denote the
fraction of high-value patients that a good doctor has within the τ ’th period after




τ even for τ = 1, because high-
value patients will not switch if they know that the practice will be sold. Clearly,
χ′τ > χ
′
B for τ > 1. Since high-value patients do not switch in equilibrium, any
equilibrium transfer price must increase with the clientele. By contradiction, we
show that a good doctor benefits more from buying the χ′τ -practice.
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(1− δd)t (χ′B fH + (1− χ′B) fL) +
∞∑
t=1
(1− δd)t δd T (χ′B),
ΠB(χ
′




(1− δd)t (χ′B fH + (1− χ′B) fL) +
∞∑
t=1
(1− δd)t δd T (χ′B),
ΠG(χ
′
B) = −T (χ′B) +
∞∑
t=0
(1− δd)t (χ′t+1 fH + (1− χ′t+1) fL) +
∞∑
t=0
(1− δd)t δd T (χ′t+1),
ΠG(χ
′
τ ) = −T (χ′τ ) +
∞∑
t=0
(1− δd)t (χ′t+τ+1 fH + (1− χ′t+τ+1) fL) +
∞∑
t=0
(1− δd)t δd T (χ′t+τ+1).
In comparison to the informative equilibrium, a bad doctor now gets a higher transfer
price after one period, because high-value patients do not switch away, because they









(1− δd)t (χ′t+τ+1 − χ′t) (fH − fL) +
∞∑
t=1
(1− δd)t δd (T (χ′t+τ+1)− T (χ′t))(21)
These terms take a simple form because the profits of good and bad doctors in
both strategies are identical in the first period, and those of the bad doctor are
independent from his strategy in all other periods. Both terms in (21) are positive
so that a good doctor has a higher increase in expected profits from buying a good
practice. This implies that in the postulated equilibrium good doctors do not buy
practices with clientele χ′B, which is a contradiction to the uninformativeness of the
postulated equilibrium. 
Note that the argument is even more general than the claim of proposition 2. It
shows that not only perfectly uninformative equilibria are impossible. It also demon-
strates that the informative equilibrium from proposition 1 is unique in the following
sense. In a stationary equilibrium, good doctors always buy good practices, and bad
doctors always buy bad practices. Otherwise, both good and bad doctors would have
to adopt a mixed strategy. This is impeded by (21).
In addition, the proof indicates that the informative equilibrium from proposition 1
is even unique in a non-stationary framework. Starting from any distribution of
clienteles, good doctors always buy the practices with high-value clienteles. At
retirement, they leave behind a practice with an even better clientele. Bad doctors
buy practices with low-value clientele, and with a large probability, this clientele
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even breaks down to χB. Hence, from any initial distribution, we have convergence
towards the informative equilibrium.
In particular, there is no equilibrium in which the price of an old practice is in-
dependent of its clientele and retiring doctor’s type. However, if switching costs s




uninformative equilibria in which patients never switch may coexist.
As already stated in remark 1, our result is more than a coordination result. In
particular, a situation in which new good owners buy bad practices cannot be sup-
ported in equilibrium because patients have only information about the quality of
the doctor they visited in the previous period, that is, information is local.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a model of reputation as a tradable intangible
asset. We have placed the model in the context of the sale of a doctor’s practice. As
mentioned in the introduction, the same formal argument can be directly applied to
other markets such as dentists’ practices, pharmacies, and lawyers’, notaries’, and
tax advisors’ offices.
The Sale of a Doctor’s Practice: Summary. We have characterized stationary
equilibria with a price difference between practices sold by good doctors and prac-
tices sold by bad doctors. In equilibrium, the two types of doctors are separated,
that is:
1. Bad new doctors do not buy practices from good old doctors.
2. Good new doctors do not buy practices from bad old doctors.
With respect to the first item, note that there is a free-riding problem because the
quality of a doctor is an experience good so that patients can leave only after they
see that the current doctor is bad. However, if the price for a practice of a good
old doctor is sufficiently high, bad new doctors do not have an incentive to free-
ride on the reputation of a good old doctor. With respect to the second property,
note that new doctors can save the money needed to buy a practice with a good
reputation and build up their reputation on their own, because over time, more and
more high-value patients visit their practice and stay. Here, the share of high value
patients can be seen as the intangible asset: since high-value patients stay unless
the treatment is bad, reputation can be traded. Indeed, if the price is sufficiently
low, buying reputation is more attractive than building up reputation over time.
The equilibrium price satisfies both properties.
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To transfer reputation it is crucial that new doctors can distinguish between practices
with a good and with a bad reputation. Since new doctors observe the old doctors’
types, they make informed decisions. However, even if they could not they would
still be able to infer the type along the equilibrium path, provided that they observe
the composition of patients within a practice – a large share of high-value patients
is an indicator that the old doctor is good (see below).
Patients have only local information about a practicing doctor, so that reputation
can only be local: Only patients frequenting a practice of a doctor in a particular
period learn the quality of that doctor in that period. Otherwise, patients do not
have any idea about the quality of other doctors. This endogenously creates switch-
ing costs (in addition to exogenous switching costs) because of quality uncertainty.
In equilibrium, these switching costs are present even when patients observe that
the old doctor is replaced by some new doctor. In other words, patients believe
that good doctors are followed by good doctors and bad doctors are followed by bad
doctors.
For sufficiently low exogenous switching costs, an uninformative equilibrium does not
exist. For higher switching costs, informative and uninformative equilibria coexist
on a certain range. From a normative point of view, an uninformative equilibrium
has the attractive feature that switching costs are avoided. However, switching may
be socially desirable if there are efficiency gains from matching high-value patients
to good doctors. This can be exemplified by the one-type model (see remark 3):
The informative equilibrium corresponds to a situation in which patients are likely
to visit a good doctor, χG > χB. In contrast, fewer patients visit good doctors in
an uninformative equilibrium.
The Sale of a Doctor’s Practice: Discussion. Certain aspects of the ambula-
tory health care sector have not been included in our model. In particular, we have
postulated that treatments have the nature of experience goods. However, they
may be viewed as, in part, having attributes of credence goods. This would mean
that patients often do not observe the quality directly after a treatment (or series of
treatments) – see the general discussion on the information of customers below. In
this subsection, we discuss aspects which are unrelated to the information patients
or new doctors receive. The corresponding model modifications are also partly of
interest for other examples.
In our model we have focused on the quality of a treatment, abstracting from the
different amount of time and number of visits it takes for a doctor, for example, to
make the correct diagnosis. To fix ideas, suppose a treatment consists of a number
of visits and tests in a given period. A good doctor can then be defined as a doctor
who makes the correct diagnosis faster, that is, fewer visits and tests are required.
This increases the utility of the patient. However, since treatment fees are not
based on the “output” (that is, the time it takes to make the correct diagnosis) but
on “input” (that is, the number of visits and the number and type of tests), a bad
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doctor may obtain higher profits in the short term.21 The increase in visits and tests
per patient by bad doctors is reminiscent of supply-induced demand, an important
topic in health economics. Our model can accommodate this feature: bad doctors
then have a stronger incentive to bid for practices with a large share of high-value
patients, and reputation transfer becomes more difficult to support.
In our model we have focused on the quality of doctors. Yet certainly, not only
qualitative attributes of a doctor play a role in a patient’s decision of whether or not
to switch practice. A new doctor certainly has horizontal characteristics different
from the retiring doctor, an obvious one is the different age and all the implications
this has. Therefore, incorporating these horizontal taste idiosyncracies into the
model, we would obtain that a larger share of patients switch practices after an
ownership change (immediately, if this characteristic is ex ante observable or with
a lag if this requires experience). Our results appear robust provided that quality
aspects are an important determinant of patient behavior.
In our model we have focused on the intangible asset of a practice. Clearly, the sale of
a practice often also involves tangible assets (long-term rental contracts, apparatuses
etc.). If these tangible assets have the same value for good and for bad doctors, our
analysis can simply be interpreted as conditional on the value of the tangible asset.
However, complementarities between tangible and intangible assets may exist. In
particular, certain apparatuses may be more useful for good doctors than for bad
doctors. Then the presence of such tangible assets reinforces our argument for the
self-selection of doctor types.
In our model we have focused on the composition of patients at a practice. In reality,
practices do not necessarily operate under full capacity. As we have pointed out in
remark 3, a model in which there is an overcapacity for treatments and a single type
of patient is a special case of our model. More generally, our result of reputation
transfer can also be shown in a model with two types of patients and an overcapacity
for treatments.
In the remainder we no longer refer to our example, the sale of a doctor’s practice.
We first discuss changes in assumptions with respect to the information new owners
and customers (in our example, patients) possess. We then discuss ways to endoge-
nize the population shares in our model. We finally discuss the possibility that the
price for a good or service is determined on the market.
The Information of New Owners. In our model, we have assumed that new
owners observe the type of the old owner. In this case, new owners do not have
any inference problem from the observed composition of the customer base to next
period’s composition; that is, they perfectly learn the type of the old owner of a
21There are two reasons for this. First, he may need more intensive or expensive tests. Second,
provided that he generates more visits by a patient per treatment, he in particular has a larger
number of visits by privately insured patients than a good doctor.
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particular practice also off-equilibrium and, given customers’ beliefs, can always
perfectly predict the composition of the customer base.
Alternatively, the only information new doctors receive is concerned with the com-
position of the customer base. Here customers have to make inferences from the past
composition and form beliefs about the old doctor’s type because this determines
which customers will stay. This complicates the off-equilibrium analysis. As we
show in appendix A.2, our results remain valid under this alternative information
assumption.
Along the same lines, new owners may also observe how long the retiring owner was
in charge of the practice. This means that although new owners do not directly
observe the old owner’s type, they know that if an owner has attracted a high share
of high-value customers and if that owner was active for more than one period, he
must be a good owner. The off-equilibrium analysis would need to be modified, but
our results remain valid.
Worsening the precision of information new owners receive about a practice for
sale, we may introduce a probability that the books of old owners are cooked, so
that there is a positive probability that they are uninformative. On the whole, our
mechanism of reputation transfer is robust to such an extension, provided that the
books are sufficiently informative. Endogenizing the precision of information, it
must be sufficiently costly to cook the books.
The Information of Customers. In our model, customers learn the quality of
the product or service after consumption. Furthermore, customers have a memory of
one period only. Note that a bounded memory could be made endogenous because
more memory would not lead to additional utility along the equilibrium path.
In our model, customers do not receive informative signals about the quality of the
products or services of firms they did not visit before. In reality, word-of-mouth
communication is likely to be relevant as a means to acquire information on owners
who are not personally known. This information typically will be noisy. Suppose
that customers can get sufficiently noisy signals about owners of other firms; then
the informative equilibrium survives. However, for low switching costs, also an
uninformative equilibrium may coexist. In this equilibrium, high-value customers
switch after ownership change to a recommended owner, whose conditional expected
quality is above average.
Word-of-mouth communication may be predominant as a means for new customers
to obtain information from experienced customers. If a share of new customers
has received information about the owner’s type from old customers and if this
information is reliable, we can simply relabel the groups of old and new customers
by including new customers who receive information in the group of experienced
customers.
Customers learn the owner’s type after one period. We can extend the model and
allow for noisy signals for customers about the quality of the owner. Suppose the
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quality is observed with a probability of less than 1. This means that the product
or service is to some extent a credence good. In our model this leads to a smooth
deterioration of the clientele, should a bad type acquire a firm previously owned by
a good one. If the detection probability is sufficiently high, our results remain valid.
The Distribution of Owner and Customer Types. Population shares are
parameters in our model. In an extended model, these can be endogenized.
We postulated that there is a fixed share of good and bad types of owners. The
model can be extended to allow for investments in education, so that those who have
invested are good doctors, whereas those who have not are bad. The investment
occurs before acquiring a firm, and it must be unobservable to customers. With ex
ante homogeneous owners the cost of investment must equal the expected difference
in lifetime profits for good compared to bad owners. In a model with heterogeneous
owners, this must hold for the marginal owner.22
The analysis can also be extended to combine adverse selection and moral hazard.
A share λG of owners, the potentially good owners, decides whether to invest in ed-
ucation leading to good quality, whereas a share λB = 1−λG is not able to improve
quality by investing in education. Then an informative equilibrium corresponds to
a situation in which potentially good owners do invest in education. A reputation
transfer alleviates the moral hazard problem. In an uninformative equilibrium, own-
ers have a weaker incentive to invest in education, which is an additional source for
a welfare loss.
We also postulated that there is a fixed share of high-value and low-value customers.
The model could be extended to allow for customers to select their type. In the
example this would be the insurance contract (e. g. full insurance/partial insurance).
With ex ante homogeneous customers, the extra cost of full insurance must equal the
expected lifetime gain from the higher probability of being served by good owners.
In a model with heterogeneous customers, this must hold for the marginal customer.
The Price of a Product or Service. In our model the price of a product or service
was exogenously given and larger for high-value than for low-value customers. This
is in line with our application to the ambulatory health-care sector in Germany. As
argued in the introduction, prices are also exogenous for many professions. However,
the scope of our argument can be substantially broadened by endogenizing the price
of the service or product. For instance, the price may be determined by bargaining
between an owner and a customer. Suppose for example that any expected surplus is
equally split. Then a low-value customer refers to a customer with a low willingness-
to-pay; correspondingly for a high-value customer. Imagine the owner’s quality were
known. Then Nash bargaining between owners and customers leads to a higher price
22As is well understood in the literature on network effects, there may exist situations with
multiple equilibria: If all other owners are good, a bad owner has a very unattractive composition
of patients, whereas if all others are bad, he will get the population average. This makes new
owners more inclined to invest in education if others do.
Observable Reputation Trading 28
for high-value customers. In addition, the net surplus for customers is larger from
bargaining with a good owner than with a bad one. In case of ownership change or
in case the customer has switched firm, bargaining takes place given the beliefs of
the customer.23 To replicate our results, we only need that the customer obtains a
higher discounted expected net surplus when facing an owner of uncertain type than
when facing a bad owner. Note that this is compatible with a situation in which the
uninformed customer receives less in the period after switching than if she stayed
with a bad owner.
Perhaps more relevant is the issue of price setting by the owner. To show that our
argument also applies to this case, we consider a simple market: suppose that there
is a single type of customer of mass λp with linear demand ad − P , d ∈ {G,B},
where aG > aB, and that firms have constant marginal cost of production c. The
firm sets a price P to all customers. Suppose furthermore, that customers observe
the price only after selecting the firm, that is, there is no price transparency (to avoid
multiplicity of equilibria we implicitly assume that each additional search involves
an infinitesimal cost ε). However, upon observing the price, they may search again.
For everything else, the assumptions of section 3 are assumed to hold.
We then can show that under some parameter restrictions, our informative equi-
librium takes a similar form to that with fixed prices. In equilibrium, good own-
ers maximize expected profits, taking into account the equilibrium mix of experi-
enced and inexperienced customers. This price P ∗ is between PG = (aG + c)/2 and
PB = (aB + c)/2. Bad owners mimic this price P
∗ in order not to be perceived to be
bad. 24 Hence, in equilibrium, customers switch whenever they observe bad quality;
they stay if the quality was good. Customers effectively ignore ownership change.
Comparing this simple model to our one-type model with fixed prices, we note
a small but interesting difference: the net surplus derived from an experienced
customer is greater than the net surplus derived from inexperienced customer. In
contrast, in our fixed price model the net surplus is independent of experience. This
difference arises because in the model with price setting a customer has variable
demand and a customer who has newly arrived or switched buys less than one
who is experienced. In other words, in this model, experienced customers are more
valuable than inexperienced customers for a good owner.
Conclusion While we framed the possibility of reputation transfer in the context
of the sale of a doctor’s practice, our argument can be applied to a wide variety of
industries. In many industries in which businesses are run by the owner, ownership
changes frequently occur (and are exogenous events). Furthermore, the change in
23Note that this is a situation with one-sided asymmetric information and interdependent values.
Unfortunately, we are not aware of results in the literature on non-cooperative bargaining that we
could directly apply (see Ausubel, Cramton, and Deneckere (2002)).
24This means that, in the underlying monopoly pricing problem, there is a pooling equilibrium
in prices and, therefore, the price of a market transaction P does not signal quality.
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ownership of a firm is often observable to customers. Nevertheless, because the
customer base is an intangible asset, reputation can be transferred at a positive
price from one generation of owners to the next.
A Technical Appendix
A.1 Proofs
Proof of lemma 1: Given that low-value patients at bad doctors’ practices switch
with probability πL = 0, the number of low-value patients applying at good practices
is equal to the rate of newborn patients, weighted with the fractions of good practices
and low-value patients,
δp λG λL = δp λG (1− λH).
The number of applying high-value patients can be taken from (8); it is
δp λG λH + χB (1− δp) (1− λG)λG = δp λG λH + δp λH
δp + λG (1− δp) (1− δp) (1− λG)λG
=
δp λG λH
δp + λG (1− δp) .
After all these high-value patients have been accepted, the spare capacity κG of a
good doctor is
κG = δp λG − (δp λG λH + χB (1− δp) (1− λG)λG)
= δp λG (1− λH)− δp λH
δp + λG (1− δp) (1− δp) (1− λG)λG.(22)
The probability of a low-value patient being accepted after having applied at a good
practice is
Pr{accepted by G|L} = κG
δp λG (1− λH)
= 1− λH
1− λH (1− λG)
1− δp
δp + λG (1− δp) .(23)
For low-value patients, there is no incentive to try and switch from a bad practice
if the costs of a trial s are sufficiently large,







Pr{accepted by G|L} (uG − uB),(24)
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where Pr{accepted by G|L} is taken from (23). 
Proof of lemma 2: (14) is structurally similar to (13). The only difference is that
for a high-value patient, the probability of being accepted is 1, hence we have to set
Pr{accepted by G|L} = 1 in (13). 
Proof of remark 2: We first calculate the probability πL with which low-value pa-
tients switch away from a bad practice in equilibrium. In analogy to (8), the number
of low-value patients arriving at good practices is
δp λG (1− λH) + (1− χB) (1− δp) (1− λG)λG πL.
The spare capacity of good doctors after all arriving high-value patients have been
accepted is given in (22); it is independent of how many low-value patients arrive.
Hence for a low-value patient, the probability of being accepted after having applied
at a good practice is
Pr{accepted by G|L} = κG
δp λG (1− λH) + (1− χB) (1− δp) (1− λG)λG πL .





Pr{accepted by G|L} (uG − uB).
When setting πL = 0, we receive sL, which obviously is equal to that calculated in
(24). When setting πL = 1, we get s˜L. Because Pr{accepted by G|L} rises with
πL, it is clear that sL > s˜L. Furthermore, one can easily prove that s˜L > 0 iff
λH < δp + λG (1− δp), which is true because of (12).
We now argue for why we obtain an informative equilibrium. For doctors and high-
value patients, expected profits are independent from how many low-value patients
try to switch practices. Therefore, also the clienteles of practices remain the same.
Consequently, all three properties of an informative equilibrium (definition 1) remain
unchanged. 
A.2 Unobservable Type of Selling Doctor
In the model, patients cannot observe the type of their doctor. New doctors, the
potential buyers of practices, can. In this section, we show that the assumption is
not crucial; new doctors do not need to know anything about the selling doctor’s
type. The clientele of old doctors are sufficiently revealing. However, in this case
the out-of-equilibrium analysis becomes more involved.
First, we need to specify the beliefs of new doctors about the old doctor’s type,
depending on his practice’s clientele. If χt−1 ∈ {χB, χG}, beliefs of new doctors are
βtG(χt−1) = β
t
B(χt−1) = χt−1 with prob. 1.
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χB with prob. δd
χB + (1− δp)χt−1 with prob. 1− δd .
Hence new doctors believe that if they buy a practice with either clientele χB or χG,
the clientele will stay unchanged for the next period. If the clientele is in between,
they infer that they are dealing with a practice that used to be bad but has been
bought by a good doctor at some point. They also infer that the practice is still
possessed by a good doctor with probability 1−δd, but is now run by a bad doctor for
the recent period with probability δd. In this case, the practice is worthless, because
all high-value patients will switch. A new doctor’s strategy now depends only on
χt−1 but not on the retiring doctor’s type. We will now calculate the clientele of
practices, χG and χB, and transfer prices T , which only depend on the observed
χt−1.
As opposed to the discussion in section 4.1, a bad doctor buying a good practice
might now retire right after one period, in which case he has not lost his clientele
yet, and can achieve a higher transfer price.
ΠB(χG) = (χG fH + (1− χG) fL) + δd TG + (1− δd) χB fH + (1− χB) fL
δd
− TG.
In a separating equilibrium, ΠB(χG) ≤ ΠB(χB) must hold. This can be rewritten as
(1− δd)TG ≥ (χG − χB) (fH − fL).(25)
Therefore,
TG ≥ 1





δp + λG (1− δp) −
δp λH





δp + λG (1− δp) (fH − fL) =: Tmin,(26)
where Tmin is again the minimum transfer price that guarantees separating, but
different from that in section 4.1. Note that if δd → 1, nearly all doctors retire after
one period. Therefore, the probability that bad doctors can resell good practices
after one period and regain the high transfer price TG is close to 1. Only if TG →∞,
they can be deterred from mimicking. On the other hand, if δd → 0, the probability
that bad doctors can regain TG is close to 0. The transfer price that suffices to
deter mimicking is only slightly higher than the one-time gains for the bad doctor,
Tmin → (χG − χB) (fH − fL). If δp → 1, nearly all patients exit after one period,
therefore hardly any information is passed to the next generation, and Tmin → 0,
because good and bad practices earn the same money. If δp → 0, patients never





(fH − fL). This analysis confirms
that δp contains the information permeability over time.
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The buying doctor must now consider the probability with which he will buy from
a good doctor. If he buys from a bad doctor, patients will leave the practice before
the new doctor can convince them that he is good. The practice is hence worthless.
If χt is observed by the new doctor, the relative probability that the old doctor
is good and has built up this clientele on his own is δd (1 − δd)t−1, because the
doctor must have “survived” for t− 1 periods, and retired in period t. The relative
probability that the doctor is already bad and that the practice is hence worthless
is δd
2 (1− δd)t−2. Hence no matter which χt a doctor observes, the probability that
the current doctor is still good (thus that he can reap some of the gains from this
clientele) is
δd (1− δd)t−1
δd (1− δd)t−1 + δd2 (1− δd)t−2
=
1− δd
(1− δd) + δd = 1− δd.
Now the crucial question is at which transfer price T (χt) a practice with a fraction
χt of high-value patients is traded. Let Tτ denote the transfer price that is paid for a
practice with a clientele that has been built up for τ ≥ 1 periods, hence Tτ = T (χτ ).
For a bad doctor considering the purchase of a practice with some clientele χt, we
have (at the indifference point)
(27) Tτ = (1− δd)
(
(χτ − χB) (fH − fL) + δd Tτ+1
)
.
On the one hand, the bad doctor pays the transfer price Tτ ; on the other hand, he
has a chance 1− δd to get a practice from a good doctor, in which case he receives
higher fees for one period and can resell the practice for a high transfer price with
probability δd.
Lemma 3 The transfer price that a bad doctor is willing to pay for a practice with
medium clientele (χτ ∈ (χG, χB)) is given by









if τ ≥ 1. However, T1 = 0.
Proof of lemma 3: We are looking for a solution to (27), which gives us a recursive
formula: We can derive Tτ+1 from Tτ . However, we would need some beginning
for the recursion. Although T (χ0) = T (χB) = 0, this does not serve our purposes,
because (27) does not hold for the step from T0 to T1. The reason is that, in
equilibrium, a bad doctor buying a practice at T0 = 0 cannot expect with any
probability to sell the practice at a higher price after one period. We can analyze
the property of Tτ as τ →∞, though. Because χτ → χG, we get
T∞ = (1− δd)
(




1− δd (1− δd) (χG − χB) (fH − fL).(29)
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Interestingly, T∞ < Tmin, although the clientele after many periods is the same. This
is because a doctor who buys a practice that has only infinitesimally lower clientele
than χG runs the risk of getting a valueless practice with probability δd. We have
T∞ < Tmin ⇐⇒(30)
1− δd




δp + λG (1− δp) (fH − fL)
1− δd (1− δd) < (1− δd)2
1− δd + δd2 < 1− 2 δd + δd2.
We now find a solution for Tτ by an “educated” guess, derived from the following
intuition. Imagine the doctors determine their Tτ “dynastywise”, i. e. such that a
doctor takes into account the gains a buying doctor expects after one period (which
is known) instead of a transfer price that he can get after one period (which is
unknown). In (31), 1− δd is the probability with which a practice is valuable at all,




(1− δd)t+1 δdt (χt+τ − χB) (fH − fL)
(31)
= (fH − fL)
∞∑
t=0






= χB (fH − fL)
∞∑
t=0
(1− δd)t+1 δdt (1− δp)− (1− δp)
t+τ+1
δp




(1− δd)t δdt (1− (1− δp)t+τ )




1− δd (1− δd) −
(1− δp)τ
1− δd (1− δd) (1− δp)
)
.
From (31) one can see directly that the recursion equation (27) is satisfied. Dividing
(27) by (fH − fL) yields
∞∑
t=0
(1− δd)t+1 δdt (χt+τ − χB)
= (χt+τ − χB) (1− δd) + (1− δd) δd
∞∑
t=0
(1− δd)t+1 δdt (χt+τ+1 − χB)
= (χt+τ − χB) (1− δd) + (1− δd) δd
∞∑
t=1
(1− δd)t δdt−1 (χt+τ − χB)
= (χt+τ − χB) (1− δd) +
∞∑
t=1
(1− δd)t+1 δdt (χt+τ − χB) ⇐⇒
(1− δd) (χτ − χB) = (χt+τ − χB) (1− δd). 
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Note that Tτ increases with τ , and limτ→∞ Tτ → T∞ as derived in (29). The reason
that T1 = 0 is that, if a good doctor sells directly after the first period, his clientele
is still χ0 = χB. Therefore, buying doctors infer that the selling doctor is bad with
probability 1. In later periods, χt > χB, and buying doctors believe that they will
be able to buy from a good doctor with positive probability. Because χτ is just a
monotone function of τ , we can write τ as a function of the clientele χ, and hence
derive T (χ) from Tτ . From (18), we get
τ(χ) =
log(1− δp χ/χB)
log(1− δp) − 1.
Substitution into (28) yields




1− δd (1− δd) −
(1− δp χ/χB)/(1− δp)
1− δd (1− δd) (1− δp)
)




1− δd (1− δd) +
δp χ− χB
1− δd (1− δd) (1− δp)
)
.(32)
Hence the transfer price T (χ) is an affine linear function of the clientele χ of a
practice (given that χ ∈ {χB, χG}).
Two properties of the sequence Tτ remain to be shown. First, in order to prove
that Tτ really renders the out-of-equilibrium transfer prices for a practice that has
accumulated a clientele χτ , we must prove that it really is the bad doctors that buy
a practice with this clientele, i. e. that good doctors prefer to buy good practices.
Second, we must show that good doctors never buy bad practices, given the sequence
Tτ of expected future transfer prices. Both question can be answered at once. We
prove that a good doctor would not buy a practice with clientele χτ for any τ ≥ 0.
Because T0 = TB = 0, we know in particular that he would not buy a bad practice
for TB = 0. We have




t (χt+τ − χG) (fH − fL) + (1− δd)t δd (Tt+τ − Tmin),
which is implied by
0 ≤ 1− (1− δd) (δd + δp − 2 δd δp) and
0 ≤ 1− δd (1− δd) (1− δp).
Both are true for δd, δp ∈ [0; 1].
Sorting of Doctors’ Types. Recall that at the transfer price Tmin, bad doctors
are indifferent about buying a good or a bad practice. To complete the analysis,
we must show that at this price, good doctors strictly prefer to buy good over bad
practices, i. e. ΠG(χG) > ΠG(χB). In their decision, they take into account that
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after τ periods, they could sell at a transfer price Tτ if they bought a bad practice.
Keeping in mind that T1 = TB = 0, this is equivalent to showing




(1− δd)t (χG − χt+1) +
∞∑
t=0
(1− δd)t δd (Tmin − Tt)




(1− δd)t (χG − χt) +
∞∑
t=1
(1− δd)t δd (Tmin − Tt+1) > 0.
This is true because Tmin > Tt and χG > χt for all t ≥ 1. Both χt and Tt rise
monotonously; χt converges against χG; and Tt is even bounded away from Tmin,
cf. (30). The intuition is that in the first period, both good and bad doctor benefit
equally from buying a good practice. Henceforth, the bad doctor no longer benefits,
whereas benefits keep accruing for the good doctor. As a consequence, there is
again perfect sorting, and the equilibrium is informative. The assumption that new
doctors get to know the old doctors’ types is thus not crucial. Finally, note that
the result on the non-existence of uninformative equilibria also holds in the present
setting.
A.3 More High-Value Patients than Good Doctors
Because there are more high-value patients than good doctors, good practices may
possibly be filled with high-value patients. In this case, it is no longer always optimal
for high-value patients at bad doctors to switch practices – if their probability of
being accepted by a good practice is close to zero, they should rather stay. In
the following, we analyze a mixed equilibrium in which high-value patients at bad
practices switch with probability πH .
The Clientele of Practices. First, note that in a mixed stationary equilibrium,
good doctors treat only high-value patients. If they also treated low-value patients,
they would have spare capacity for more high-value patients, thus a high-value
patient would be accepted by a good practice with certainty. Consequently, χG = 1,
and from the market clearing condition (analogously to (9)), we receive
λH = λG + χB (1− λG) ⇐⇒ χB = λH − λG
1− λG .(34)
Boundaries on Switching Costs s. Like in section 4.1, we have qualitatively
different switching behavior for different values of s. For very large s (if s ≥ s˜H ,
where s˜H is to be specified), neither type of patients switch. For smaller s (if
s ∈ (sH , s˜H)), low-value patients never switch, and high-value patients adopt a
mixed strategy, switching away from bad doctors with probability πH . For s < sH ,
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high-value patients always switch away from bad doctors. Even for infinitesimal
s, low-value patients do not attempt to switch from bad doctors, because their
probability of being accepted by a good doctor is zero.
The number of good patients that switch practices is (1− δp)λB χB πH , as 1− δp is
the fraction of surviving patients, λB is the fraction of bad practices, χB the fraction
of high-value patients. Additionally, there are δp λH newborn patients looking for
practices. The total number of high-value patients searching new practices is thus
δp λH + (1− δp)λB χB πH
= δp λH + (1− δp) (1− λG)λH − λG
1− λG πH
= δp λH + (1− δp) (λH − λG)πH .(35)
Each patient only has the probability λG of finding a good practice, and this good
practice has free capacity δp, the number of patients that have exited recently. Hence
the probability of being accepted after having applied by a good practice is
Pr{accepted by G|H} = δp
δp λH + (1− δp) (λH − λG)πH .(36)
In equilibrium, expected utilities must coincide, hence




= (uG − uB) δp





δp λH + (1− δp) (λH − λG)πH =⇒
π∗H =
(uG − uB)/s− δp λH
(1− δp) (λH − λG) .(37)
We can now derive the critical sH (for which π
∗
H = 1) and s˜H (for which π
∗
H = 0),
π∗H = 1 =⇒ sH =
uG − uB
λH − (1− δp)λG ,




Again, we concentrate on pure equilibria, hence we assume that s < sH ; hence
high-value patients always switch away from bad practices.
The Separating Transfer Price T . A transfer price TG that guarantees a sepa-
rating equilibrium must satisfy TG ≥ Tmin, with Tmin as in (16).
Building up Goodwill. We now consider the case in which a good doctor buys
a bad practice. The issue now becomes more involved than in section 4, because







Figure 4: Switching Probabilities πH and πL of Patients
a good doctor will reach a clientele of 100% high-value patients already after finite
time. Integer problems arise.
In t = 0, the fraction of high-value patients is χB. In t = 1, it goes up to χB (1 −























λH > δp + λG (1− δp).
We again found (12), using the opposite parameter constellation. In this case, a















periods, where · stands for rounded up numbers.
Because of the integer problem, further calculations with χτ become rather tedious.
All we have to show is that, for a good doctor, buying a bad practice and building
up reputation is inferior to buying a good practice right away. We can follow the
same approach as used in proposition 2. If χt and Tt increase with time, the benefit
that good new doctors have from buying a good practice is higher than that of
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bad doctors, bearing in mind that sums end at time τ1). However, there is one
additional prerequisite: If there are an abundance of high-value patients, practices
of good doctors reach the maximal clientele χ = 1 already after one period (τ1 = 1).
In this case, benefits from buying a good practice are the same for both types of
new doctors. We have










1− δp 1− λG
λH − λG
)
> 2 log(1− δp)
1− δp 1− λG
λH − λG > (1− δp)
2 = 1− 2 δp + δ2p
λH <
1 + (1− δp)λG
2− δp .
The same intuition as in the main text applies, and we have the following remark.
Remark 4 (Informative Equilibrium) Assume that
λH <
1 + (1− δp)λG
2− δp .
Then an informative equilibrium as described in proposition 1 exists.
Again, for relatively low switching costs, there is no uninformative equilibrium.
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